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ABSTRACT: The financial crisis has revealed gaps in the protection of EU citizens against unjust dep-
rivations of their rights, including the right to effective judicial protection, due to the difficulty in 
challenging the consequences of the conditionality imposed. This Article suggests that the deficient 
protection derives from the limited scope of application of fundamental rights under the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) and its unstable judicial interpretation, 
along with the fact that EU citizenship rights have not developed sufficiently. I will, however, argue 
that there is a duty to protect citizens within a constitutionalised Union, against any deprivations of 
their rights contrary to the values of the Union itself. This Article aims to fill these gaps, by develop-
ing the connection between EU fundamental and EU citizenship rights, using the judicially devel-
oped “substance of the rights” doctrine. Various attempts have been made to achieve this end, yet 
some loose ends remain which are largely addressed in this Article through the establishment of a 
new jurisdictional test, which combines a dynamic reading of Art. 20 TFEU and the “substance of 
the rights” doctrine, and Art. 2 TEU and fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. 
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I. Introduction 
The EU is no longer an organisation which merely pursues economic objectives but is 
also evolving towards a more political and constitutionalised Union. The Article sup-
ports the idea that the political integration in the domain of EU fundamental rights is 
primarily evolving through a “triangular” inter-connected system of protection, including 
the constructivist transformation of EU citizenship, the institutionalised developments 
of EU law1 and the protection of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. Yet 
major components of a comprehensive and all-embracing fundamental rights policy are 
still absent, which is even more perceptible during periods of crisis, such as the recent 
financial crisis, where the gaps in citizens’ rights protection became evident due to the 
difficulties encountered in challenging the consequences of the conditionality im-
posed.2 This deficient protection largely derived from the restricted scope of application 
of fundamental rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(Charter), its unstable judicial interpretation and in turn from the unwillingness of the 
Court to rule on complex financial cases. The financial crisis and its mechanisms consti-
tute a useful case study from which to assess the modern “triangular” protection of 
rights and encourage interest in assessing new legal paths to reinforce it. 
Although EU citizenship has not played a substantial role in the financial crisis, this Ar-
ticle suggests that it is not constrained to its current, “confined” form, since it is designed 
to encounter constant evolution and progress.3 Its constructive character culminated in 
the judicially developed “substance of the rights” doctrine, which has substantially altered 
the architecture of EU fundamental rights protection towards including purely internal 
violations within the Union’s scope if they amount to emptying Union citizenship rights of 
their substantive meaning. When placed within a new jurisdictional test, the doctrine can 
arguably fill the gaps of the current protection system in an effort to link EU fundamental 
and citizenship rights and propose an alternative, more effective use of rights. 
II. Setting the scene: legal characteristics of the “triangular” 
fundamental rights protection system 
The first corner of the “triangle” is the legal concept of Union citizenship,4 which consti-
tuted a decisive step towards a constitutionalised Union;5 although a relevant personal 
 
1 D. KOSTAKOPOULOU, Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change, in The 
Modern Law Review, 2005, p. 250 et seq. 
2 A.J. MENÉNDEZ, The Existential Crisis of the European Union, in German Law Journal, 2013, p. 455. 
3 Commission of the European Communities, Intergovernmental Conference: Contributions by the 
Commission, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991, p. 87; C. CLOSA, 
The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union, in Common Market Law Review, 1992, p. 1167. 
4 D. KOSTAKOPOULOU, Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship, cit., p. 250. 
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status had clearly matured long before its formal incorporation in the Maastricht Trea-
ty.6 The list of rights provided under Art. 20 TFEU, although non-exhaustive, fell short of 
establishing the full range of modern citizenship rights,7 since no legal connection was 
declared with fundamental rights. The Commission, however, defined EU citizenship as 
a dynamic concept which should always reflect “the aims of the Union, […] stemming 
from the gradual and coherent development of the Union's political, economic and so-
cial dimension”.8 It has indeed proved to be of “constructivist” nature, especially 
through the Court of Justice’s case law, by deepening European integration, based on a 
federal logic, while broadening the potential impact on EU fundamental rights. Namely, 
after Martínez Sala,9 EU citizenship demonstrated a shift away from “economic and 
market citizens”, to a social and political dimension,10 while establishing protection 
against discrimination based on nationality and a free-standing right to move and re-
side freely.11 The constructivist nature of EU citizenship culminated with the inclusion of 
new, unwritten rights into the concept, through the “substance of the rights” doctrine. 
Regardless of the influence exerted by EU citizenship in forming current policies, a 
significant role was also played by the “effects of institutional interaction”,12 such as the 
 
5 A. WIENER, The Constructive Potential of Citizenship: Building European Union, in Policy & Politics, 
1999, p. 271 et seq. 
6 D. KOCHENOV, R. PLENDER, EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Dis-
covery of the Treaty Text, in European Law Review, 2012, p. 372; R. WELGE, Union Citizenship as Demoi-
cratic Institution: Increasing the EU’s Subjective Legitimacy Through Supranational Citizenship, in Journal 
of European Public Policy, 2015, p. 56; T. KOSTAKOPOULOU, Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the Eu-
ropean Union: Between Past and Future, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010; S. O’LEARY, The 
Relationship Between Community Citizenship and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Community 
Law, in Common Market Law Review, 1995, p. 519. 
7 European Parliament, Resolution of 14 June 1991 on Union citizenship, Doc. A3-0139/91; C. CLOSA, 
Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States, in Common Market Law Review, 1995, p. 490. 
8 Commission of the European Communities, Intergovernmental Conference: Contributions by the 
Commission, cit., p. 87. 
9 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 1998, case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern. 
10 S. O’LEARY, Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship, in European Law Review, 
1999, p. 68 et seq.; D. KOCHENOV, Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Rela-
tionship Between Status and Rights, in Columbia Journal of European Law, 2009, p. 173 et seq. 
11 Court of Justice: judgment of 20 September 2001, case C-184/99, Grzelczyk; judgment of 17 Sep-
tember 2002, case C-413/99, Baumbast and R, para. 83; judgment of 7 September 2004, case C-456/02, 
Trojani [GC]; judgment of 26 October 2006, case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen and Tas; Opinion of AG Kokkott de-
livered on 30 March 2006, case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen and Tas, para. 33. See C. BARNARD, The Substantive 
Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
12 D. KOSTAKOPOULOU, Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship, cit., p. 264; J.B. LIISBERG, Does the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community Law? Article 53 of the Charter: A 
Fountain of Law of Just an Inkblot, in Jean Monnet Working Papers, no. 4, 2001, p. 7; K. LENAERTS, Exploring 
the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2012, p. 375; 
G. ARESTIS, Fundamental Rights in the EU: Three Years After Lisbon, the Luxembourg Perspective, in Col-
lege of Europe Cooperative Research Papers, no. 2, 2013, p. 2; C.B. SCHNEIDER, The Charter of Fundamen-
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Charter, whose list of rights is far more extensive, as it reunites a wide range of rights 
and freedoms – including socioeconomic rights – which have been violated the most 
during the financial crisis.13 On the contrary, considering the nature of the two con-
cepts, the list under EU citizenship might currently be limited, but its constructivist na-
ture arguably allows for expansion of the “inter alia list” under Art. 20 TFEU. Therefore, 
while the list of rights under the Charter adequately incorporates the rights violated 
during the financial crisis, the precise extent of Union citizenship rights cannot be clear-
ly defined from a strictly textual perspective. However, it is generally believed that the 
essence of EU citizenship is much broader than the list provided by Art. 20, para. 2, 
TFEU, in the broader sense of what supranational citizenships entail.14 
The third piece of the EU triangular system is the protection of fundamental rights 
as general principles of EU law, many of which are unwritten and judge-made, but the 
majority of which have been codified in the Treaties over time.15 They inter alia assist 
with judicial interpretations and legal reviews,16 but more importantly, they are largely 
used to fill legal gaps where relevant EU laws are lacking or do not provide a concrete 
answer.17 It can thus be argued that general principles are both institutional and con-
structive in nature since they are enshrined in the Treaty, but the Court regularly recog-
nises new rights as falling within the “general principles umbrella”, under Art. 2 TEU. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness and potential use of the instruments in a crisis largely 
depends on their material and/or personal scope of application and the existence of any 
legal restrictions. The scope of EU citizenship was largely based on the logic of economic 
growth,18 which has arguably diminished its essence and the attempts made in the Maas-
 
tal Rights of the European Union: The Evolution of the First Bill of Rights of the European Union and Its 
Position Within the Constellation of National and Regional Fundamental Rights Protection Systems, in 
Bridging Europe Working Paper, 2014, p. 2 et seq. 
13 S. PEERS, T. HERVEY, J. KENNER, A. WARD (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary, 
London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014. 
14 D. KOCHENOV, On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator, in D. KOCHENOV (ed.), EU 
Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 26 et seq. 
15 A. CUYVERS, General Principles of EU Law, in E. UGIRASHEBUJA, J.E. RUHANGISA, T. OTTERVANGER, A. 
CUYVERS (eds), East African Community Law: Institutional, Substantive and Comparative EU Aspects, Lei-
den: Brill Nijhoff, 2017, p. 220. 
16 Court of Justice: judgment of 19 November 1991, joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, para. 30; 
judgment of 5 March 1996, joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur, paras 27-36; judgment of 
8 April 2004, joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [GC], para. 10. 
17 Court of Justice: judgment of 23 April 1986, case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, para. 12; judg-
ment of 19 January 2010, case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci [GC], para. 21. 
18 S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, In Search of Union Citizenship, in Yearbook of European Law, 1998, p. 30 et seq.; 
P. EECKHOUT, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question, in Common Market Law 
Review, 2002, p. 971; N. NIC SHUIBHNE, The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship, in Common Market Law 
Review, 2010, p. 1621 et seq.; D. KOCHENOV, A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel 
Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe, in Columbia Journal of European Law, 2011, p. 61. 
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tricht Treaty to connect it with the citizen.19 However, the CJEU has identified an increasing 
number of “citizenship cases in which the element of true movement is either barely dis-
cernible or non-existent”,20 while the scope ratione materiae of EU law has been further 
stretched to cover virtually hypothetical cross-border situations.21 EU citizenship has fur-
ther managed to overcome the strict requirement for a cross-border element completely, 
by creating an independent, EU citizenship-based right,22 and redefining the material and 
personal scope of EU citizenship23 to allow more cases to fall within the CJEU’s jurisdiction. 
Most importantly, in Ruiz Zambrano the Court ruled that Art. 20 TFEU prevents Member 
States from taking measures which have the effect of “depriving EU citizens of the genu-
ine enjoyment of the substance of rights conferred on them by the citizenship of the Un-
ion”.24 It, therefore, created the possibility of EU law “intervening”, once the enjoyment of 
the essence of EU citizenship rights is brought into question.25 
The restriction on the field of application of the Charter under Art. 51, para. 1,26 also 
severely limits the scope of fundamental rights policies, including the relevant jurisdic-
tion for challenges to austerity measures. The Court has not accepted the restriction 
easily, although it continues to be difficult to predict whether a domestic measure will 
be found to be bound by the Charter.27 The Court has interestingly interpreted “imple-
mentation” under Art. 51, para. 1, broadly as meaning to “fall within the scope of EU 
law”.28 In Åkerberg Fransson29 a remote connection with EU law was enough to trigger 
 
19 E. SPAVENTA, Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and Its Consti-
tutional Effects, in Common Market Law Review, 2008, p. 40; J. SHAW, Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at 
the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism, in Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper Series, no. 
14, 2010, p. 11. 
20 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010, case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano; H. VAN 
EIJKEN, S.A. DE VRIES, A New Route into the Promised Land? Being a European Citizen After Ruiz Zambrano, 
in European Law Review, 2011, p. 710; A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: 
An Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 2008, p. 50 et seq. See fur-
ther Court of Justice, judgment of 14 October 2008, case C-353/06, Grunkin and Paul [GC]. 
21 Court of Justice: judgment of 2 October 2003, case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, para. 45; judgment of 
19 October 2004, case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen, para. 45; judgment of 12 July 2005, case C-403/03, 
Schempp [GC], para. 47; E. SPAVENTA, Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees, cit., p. 21. 
22 C. O’BRIEN, “Hand-to-Mouth” Citizenship: Decision Time for the UK Supreme Court on the Sub-
stance of Zambrano Rights, EU Citizenship and Equal Treatment, in Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law, 2016, p. 229 et seq. 
23 Court of Justice, judgement of 2 March 2010, case C-135/08, Rottmann [GC]. 
24 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [GC], para. 42. 
25 A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations, cit., p. 50 et seq. 
26 F. FONTANELLI, The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States under Article 51(1) of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in Columbia Journal of European Law, 2014, p. 193 et seq. 
27 Ibid., p. 193. 
28 Court of Justice: judgment of 18 June 1991, case C-260/89, ERT v. DEP, para. 42; judgment of 13 
June 1996, case C-144/95, Maurin. 
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the Charter, stressing how much grey area remains in the interpretation of this provi-
sion. The scope of EU fundamental rights is therefore interpreted variously, with the 
Charter being more likely to apply to national rules in cases with a stronger EU interest 
while applying only in extreme cases regarding the co-ordination of rules.30 Therefore, 
although the Court has interpreted Art. 51, para. 1, broadly, the level of discretion avail-
able allows it to promote a differentiated understanding of the Charter’s scope of appli-
cation in selected cases. The vagueness and uncertainty deriving therefrom31 were also 
criticised by the European Parliament, stating that the citizens’ expectations “go beyond 
the Charter’s strictly legal provisions” and called on the Commission to do more to meet 
citizens’ expectations.32 Within the framework of strengthening the protection of EU 
fundamental rights, the Parliament had even proposed the deletion of Art. 51 of the 
Charter,33 recognising the structural difficulties it creates. A reinforced system, towards 
a truly constitutionalised Union, could be achieved by adopting a broader and more 
stable use of the Charter, to make rights more visible to citizens, especially in situations 
which are firmly within the scope of EU law or have a clear connection with it, such as 
those of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
General principles of EU law are also invoked when “implementing Union law”, in view 
of the fact that almost all Charter rights have been previously recognised as general prin-
ciples.34 Unlike the Charter, however, due to their hybrid nature, the scope of application 
of general principles is not as restricted.35 According to AG Bot in his Opinion in Scattolon, 
the restrictive scope of application defined for the Charter was not intended to restrict the 
scope of application of the fundamental rights recognised as general principles of EU 
 
29 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2013, case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson [GC]; European 
Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitu-
tional Affairs, The Interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Dilemma of 
Stricter or Broader Application of the Charter to National Measures – Study by E. Spaventa, Brussels: Eu-
ropean Union, 2016, PE 556.930, www.europarl.europa.eu. 
30 European Parliament, The Interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
cit., p. 10. 
31 F. FONTANELLI, The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States under Article 51(1) of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, cit., p. 200. 
32 European Parliament Resolution P8_TA(2016)0021 of 21 January 2016 on the activities of the 
Committee of Petitions 2014, para. 24. 
33 European Parliament Resolution P7_TA(2014)0173 of 27 February 2014 on the situation of funda-
mental rights in the European Union (2012), para. 15. 
34 M.J. VAN DEN BRINK, EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights: Taking EU Citizenship Rights Seri-
ously, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 2012, p. 287. 
35 K. LENAERTS, J.A. GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of 
EU Law, in Common Market Law Review, 2010, p. 1640; T. TRIDIMAS, Horizontal Effect of General Principles: 
Bold Rulings and Fine Distinctions, in U. BERNITZ, X. GROUSSOT, F. SCHULYOK (eds), General Principles of EU 
Law and European Private Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2013; Court of Justice, judgment of 
13 July 1989, case 5/88, Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft.  
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law,36 which can still be invoked where the Charter cannot. Therefore, in terms of the 
scope of application of the respective instruments, it is argued that a constructivist under-
standing of EU citizenship can more effectively overcome its restrictions compared to the 
Charter, demonstrating its greater potential for safeguarding citizens’ rights.37 
III. The modern protection of fundamental rights 
To cope with the financial crisis and safeguard financial stability in the euro area,38 new 
mechanisms were adopted,39 including the permanent ESM, which was established as 
an international, intergovernmental Treaty (ESMT)40 concluded and ratified by the 
Member States outside the EU legal order. Accordingly, Art. 136, para. 3, TFEU states 
that the mechanism is activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro 
area as a whole, subject to strict conditionality,41 which is agreed under the relevant 
memoranda of understanding (MoUs). As a way to alleviate budgetary concerns, condi-
tionality is based on austerity and includes reductions in public spending, cuts in wages 
and increases in tax revenues.42 Although necessary for the mechanism to work,43 the 
conditionality imposed was repeatedly challenged for fundamental rights infringe-
ments.44 Due to the diversified legal establishment and the use of the financial assis-
tance mechanisms, the judicial challenges have proven arduous,45 while the current 
protection system has been largely ineffective in protecting EU citizens’ rights. 
 
36 Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 5 April 2011, case C-108/10, Scattolon, para. 120. 
37 D. KOCHENOV, A Real European Citizenship, cit., p. 61. 
38 K. TUORI, K. TUORI, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014; European Commission, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, in Economic and Financial Affairs, 
2015, p. 28; Regulation (EU) 407/2010 of the Council of 11 May 2010 on establishing a European financial 
stabilisation mechanism; Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro Area Member 
States Meeting Within the Council of the European Union of 10 May 2010, Council Document 9614/10 
(whereby the governments agreed to provide financial assistance through a Special Purpose Vehicle). 
39 P.M. RODRIGUEZ, A Missing Piece of European Emergency Law: Legal Certainty and Individuals’ Ex-
pectations in the EU Response to the Crisis, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2016, p. 270. 
40 Recitals 1 and 5of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
41 View of AG Kokott delivered on 26 October 2012, case C-370/12, Pringle, paras 142-143; P. CRAIG, 
Pringle and the Nature of Legal Reasoning, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 
2014, p. 208 et seq. 
42 S. THEODOROPOULOU, A. WATT, Withdrawal Symptoms: An Assessment of the Austerity Packages in 
Europe, in European Trade Union Institute Working Papers, no. 2, 2011, p. 11 et seq. 
43 H. GILLIAMS, Stress Testing the Regulator: Review of State Aid to Financial Institutions After the Col-
lapse of Lehman, in European Law Review, 2011, p. 5 et seq.; H.R.B. AVALOS, Moral Hazard in the Euro-
Zone, in Munich Personal RePEc Archive Papers, no. 61103, 2012, p. 2 et seq.; Court of Justice, judgment 
of 27 November 2012, case C-370/12, Pringle, paras 69 and 111. 
44 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of Eco-
nomic Crisis – Issue Paper by N. Lusiani, I. Saiz, 2014, book.coe.int. 
45 C. KILPATRICK, On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values 
in Europe’s Bailouts, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2015, p. 331. 
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The Court has repeatedly referred to the Charter in its rulings, only to conclude in 
most cases that it cannot be invoked due to a lack of connection with EU law. Therefore, 
leaving aside the level of protection which could actually have been offered by the Char-
ter, the Court’s persistent preference for interpreting Art. 51, para. 1, in the narrowest 
way possible when in fact a connection with EU law could be identified, has led EU citi-
zens to a state of deadlock in such actions. This is primarily the case in claims against 
the Member States, which are under a duty to implement the agreed conditionality into 
national laws, in order to restore stability and return to sustainable growth.46 The Court, 
in Pringle47 and later in Sindicatos dos Bancarios,48 ruled that the provisions of the 
Charter do not apply to the implementation of the MoUs for the provision of stability 
support under the ESM since the Member States are not implementing Union law with-
in the meaning of Art. 51, para. 1, of the Charter.49 The Pringle ruling had raised intense 
debate, since the ESMT indicates that the EU framework should be observed by the ESM 
members, especially “the economic governance rules” set out in the TFEU,50 while pre-
vious rulings and principles allowed more room for a connecting link with EU law.51 
Further reluctance was manifested in Sindicato Nacional,52 where the Court narrowly 
ruled that it had no jurisdiction to determine the request for a preliminary ruling since no 
link with EU law was found.53 In contrast, although the Portuguese Government seemed 
to “have gone further than its commitments in the MoU”,54 the national legislation also 
makes express reference to the Council Decision on granting financial assistance, thus at 
least a remote link between the national measure with EU law was evident. The Court of 
Justice was straightforwardly asked about the validity and interpretation of specific provi-
sions implemented in national law in Florescu, where it had for the first time indicated 
that since the MoU is an act of the EU institutions, it must be regarded as implementing 
 
46 European Stability Mechanism, The Republic of Cyprus, Central Bank of Cyprus, Financial Assis-
tance Facility Agreement between European Stability Mechanism and The Republic of Cyprus as the Ben-
eficiary Member State and Central Bank of Cyprus as Central Bank, www.esm.europa.eu. 
47 Pringle, cit., para. 178. 
48 Court of Justice, order of 7 March 2013, case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and Others. 
49 F.J. MENA PARRAS, The European Stability Mechanism Through the Legal Meanderings of the Union’s 
Constitutionalism: Comment on Pringle, in European Law Review, 2013, p. 850 et seq.; Pringle, cit., para. 180. 
50 G. BECK, The Court of Justice, Legal Reasoning, and the Pringle Case – Law as the Continuation of 
Politics by Other Means, in European Law Review, 2014, p. 240; A. HINAREJOS, The Court of Justice of the EU 
and the Legality of the European Stability Mechanism, in Cambridge Law Journal, 2013, p. 237. 
51 Court of Justice: judgment of 12 February 2009, case C-45/07, Commission v. Greece; judgment of 
20 April 2010, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden, para. 91; C. BARNARD, The Charter, the Court – and 
the Crisis, in University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Papers, no. 18, 2013, p. 9. 
52 Court of Justice, order of 26 June 2014, case C-264/12, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Se-
guros e Afins. 
53 See also, Court of Justice, order of 10 May 2012, case C-134/12, Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor. 
54 C. BARNARD, The Charter in Time of Crisis: A Case Study of Dismissal, in N. COUNTOURIS, M. FREEDLAND 
(eds), Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 262. 
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that law according to Art. 51, para. 1, despite the amount of discretion they have in decid-
ing the implementing measures.55 As a whole, the Charter failed to protect EU citizens’ 
rights completely during the financial crisis, primarily because the unstable status of the 
restriction under Art. 51, para. 1, allowed the CJEU to treat claims against Member States 
as purely internal,56 even when a remote connection with EU law existed. This approach 
largely deprived citizens of the ability to proceed in such litigation to the factual assess-
ment of the disputed measures and possible remedies. 
The Charter has been more successfully invoked against the acts of the EU institu-
tions tasked with negotiating the MoUs and overseeing the austerity plan.57 In her view in 
Pringle, AG Kokott emphasised that the Commission remains a Union institution and is 
bound by the full extent of EU law, even when acting within the framework of the ESM.58 
Accordingly, the Court in Ledra Advertising Ltd stated that the Commission retains within 
the framework of the ESMT, its role as guardian of the Treaties and should refrain from 
signing an MoU whose consistency with EU law and the Charter is doubtful.59 
In contrast, fundamental rights as general principles of EU law have rarely been 
used and only recently with any positive effect. Specifically, Associação Sindical dos 
Juízes Portugueses60 questioned the compatibility of austerity measures imposed on 
the judiciary with the principle of judicial independence. The Court clearly sought to 
overcome the legal barrier of the Charter by invoking the principle of effective judicial 
protection under Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, since according to the Court, its material scope 
goes beyond that of Art. 47 of the Charter. Although this is a beneficial development for 
fundamental rights, it is another demonstration of the Charter’s weaknesses, forcing 
the Court to resort to concepts from the pre-constitutionalisation years, where the pro-
tection of rights solely depended on general principles. In contrast to the minimal appli-
cation of the Charter and the general principles, EU citizenship has not played any sub-
stantive role in the austerity measures case law. This is primarily due to the limited list 
of rights attached to it, rendering it irrelevant in such cases, which are grounded in al-
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leged fundamental rights’ infringements, thus demoting citizenship from being “the 
fundamental status of Union citizens”.61 
The limited applicability of these legal instruments left many wondering how fun-
damental rights can be among the foundational values of a constitutionalised Union if 
their use can be limited more easily than it can be invoked. It has also resulted in a gap 
in effective judicial protection, because of the limited routes available to access justice, 
the reluctance of the Courts to support those seeking to minimise the impact of the 
austerity measures and finally because the Court’s rulings were largely based on rea-
sons unconnected with law, but rather with politics.62 The reluctance of the Court is ar-
guably based on the nature of the claims under dispute, which include complex eco-
nomic situations and can have substantial impact on national democracy.63 The Court 
has therefore demonstrated a preference for “evading” performing legal assessment, 
rather than embarking on judicial activism, so as to avoid the hostile reaction which 
would ensue. A disparity in the pursuit of Union objectives is also demonstrated, name-
ly that the Court seems more willing now to act to address the current rule of law crisis 
and protect the democratic judicial processes at the national and European level64 than 
it did during the financial crisis. That interest in assessing new routes to equally safe-
guard citizens’ rights and Union’s objectives has been prompted, such as the use of EU 
citizenship in novel areas using the recent “substance of the rights” doctrine. 
IV. The Court’s “substance of the rights” doctrine 
To tackle the limitations of EU law described above effectively, a broader scope of appli-
cation of fundamental rights is needed, using a “living instrument” with transformative 
qualities, such as the concept of EU citizenship, and the “substance of the rights” doc-
trine. Rottmann,65 in particular, has been correctly described as the foundation which 
paved the way towards the emancipation of EU citizenship from the limits inherent in 
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its free movement origins.66 The Court indicated the importance of having due regard 
to EU law when exercising national powers within the sphere of nationality,67 and spe-
cifically ruling that where an EU citizen is addressed by a decision withdrawing naturali-
sation, which causes him to lose the status and the rights conferred by Art. 20 TFEU, this 
falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of EU law.68 The cit-
izenship-specific rights which a person would lose are thus emphasised, rather than the 
general human rights imperative, which indicates a substantial increase in the effect of 
EU citizenship on national citizenship.69 
The Ruiz Zambrano case offered further insights into this development and extend-
ed the idea that Member States and the EU should leave the substantive core of rights 
under EU citizenship intact.70 In answering the question of whether Art. 20 TFEU has an 
autonomous character and serves as a sufficient connection with EU law, the Court of 
Justice developed a jurisdictional test, whereby national measures are precluded if de-
priving EU citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of EU citizenship rights.71 
Consequently, third-country nationals obtain a derived right to reside in their children’s 
Member State of nationality under Art. 20 TFEU when the factual conditions of Ruiz 
Zambrano are met.72 This ruling constitutes one of the most inspiring of the last dec-
ade, primarily due to it marking a departure from the traditional cross-border concept, 
as the Court interpreted Art. 20 TFEU as a sufficient link in itself,73 consequently extend-
ing the scope of application of EU law. Secondly, because the prohibition against a viola-
tion of the substance of rights has been applied as a self-standing EU test,74 while it had 
hitherto been applied within the context of the proportionality test. Despite the poten-
tially enormous implications of the doctrine, it has been characterised as frustratingly 
opaque,75 since little clarity was provided with regards to the circumstances under 
which it can be invoked. 
Subsequent case law provided further clarity, which can boil down to two major 
conclusions on the conditions for triggering the recently developed doctrine. Firstly, it is 
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evident that not every limitation of a right will trigger the doctrine but only its depriva-
tion. In particular, the Court clarified in McCarthy76 that Art. 21 TFEU is “applicable to 
situations that have the effect of depriving [a Union citizen] of the genuine enjoyment of 
the substance of the rights” under EU citizenship or of “impeding the exercise of his 
right of free movement and residence” within the Member States.77 The use of the doc-
trine does not thus depend on an EU citizens’ age but rather upon the seriousness of 
the restraint to the substance of the rights normally conferred. Therefore, a distinction 
is made whereby the “impeding effect” refers to the traditional line of case law requiring 
a cross-border link, without requiring the national measures to cause the loss of the 
status of Union citizens in practice.78 If no cross-border situation occurs, only a depriva-
tion of the substance of the rights will trigger EU law,79 requiring the national measure 
to create more than a “serious inconvenience”. 
Moreover, in Dereci,80 the Court indicated that the “deprivation” of the substance of 
the rights refers to situations in which the Union citizen not only has to leave the terri-
tory of the Member State but the Union territory as a whole.81 The strict approach was 
confirmed in lida,82 where the Court recalled that “purely hypothetical prospects of ex-
ercising the right of freedom of movement” and of that right being obstructed83 do not 
establish a sufficient link with EU law. This stricter approach84 emphasised the need to 
determine whether there is a relationship of dependency with the child’s primary car-
er,85 while a major part underlying the Court’s reasoning was clearly based on the re-
spect for the division and balance of competences as enshrined in Art. 5 TEU. The Court 
of Justice affirmed in Rendón Marín that the prohibition under Art. 20 TFEU, only applies 
in “very specific” situations, while this derived right cannot be refused when the effec-
tiveness of EU citizenship is to be disregarded.86 Therefore, in the Court’s view, any pos-
sible limitations on the substance of citizenship rights undermine its effectiveness.87 A 
de facto loss of a Union citizenship right is thus required, which rightly reduces the con-
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sequences of the test without being too intrusive.88 Although it is believed that funda-
mental rights should not be ruled out based on a narrow reading of the Treaties,89 the 
doctrine should be applied only when EU citizenship rights are deprived and cannot be 
remedied at the national level, to keep the test within the limits of an acceptable federal 
and legal balance within the EU. 
The second conclusion of the analysis concerns the argument that the “inter alia 
clause” under Art. 20, para. 2, TFEU suggests that citizens can enjoy further rights, beyond 
those expressly stated therein, not only through the procedure enshrined under Art. 25 
TFEU but also through the judicial incorporation of unwritten rights.90 Following the re-
cent judicial developments, the list has indeed been expanded to include new rights, con-
trary to the allegation of McCarthy that the approach put forward in Ruiz Zambrano was 
only applicable to the “rights listed in Art. 20, para. 2, TFEU”.91 This consideration is argua-
bly rather unexpected and inaccurate since the recent series of case law has protected EU 
citizens’ rights not expressly listed in Art. 20, para. 2, TFEU, such as the right against forced 
removal from the EU’s territory or even the ability to benefit from equality in a wholly in-
ternal situation outside the scope of EU law.92 It is therefore argued that the extent of Un-
ion citizenship rights is much broader than what is defined in a textual sense.93 
V. The way forward: taking the “substance of the rights” doctrine a 
step further 
The establishment of a link between the jurisprudential doctrines of EU citizenship and 
EU fundamental rights would arguably overcome the deficiencies identified in protect-
ing EU citizens’ rights. It also constitutes the “next logical step” to EU citizenship’s evolu-
tion, since, throughout the integration process, the reinforcement of the protection of 
fundamental rights and the empowerment of EU citizenship have been two closely con-
nected phenomena.94 Over the years, various attempts to strengthen this link have 
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been endeavoured, yet none has been successful, including the idea of extending the 
application of EU fundamental rights to mobile citizens,95 the equation of the “scope of 
EU law” to Union competences regardless of whether they have been exercised or not96 
and the so-called “reverse” Solange proposal.97 
The starting point for the proposed way forward is that beyond the scope of Art. 51, 
para. 1, of the Charter, fundamental rights issues are left to national laws and Courts. 
The recent doctrine, however, allowed some room for EU intervention, if an internal vio-
lation amounts to detaching Union citizenship from its substantive sense.98 The pro-
posal brings the classic doctrine a step further, by proposing a three-step jurisdictional 
test which will allow EU fundamental rights, beyond the ones mentioned under the list, 
to be used in exceptional wholly internal situations, through a combined dynamic read-
ing of Art. 2 TEU, the general principles of EU law and Art. 20 TFEU. 
v.1. Delimiting the proposal in accordance with Art. 2 TEU 
Broadening the scope of application of fundamental rights cannot be achieved merely 
by extending the list of EU citizenship rights already falling within the sphere of the 
“substance of the rights” doctrine. It is therefore necessary to focus on cases which re-
quire EU intervention by delimiting the scope of application of the proposal to the es-
sential core of rights, which represents the untouchable core or minimum circle of fun-
damental rights common to the Member States, which cannot be diminished or 
breached without the right in question losing its value either for the right holder or for 
society as a whole.99 This idea is elaborated on the basis of Art. 2 TEU,100 and Member 
States remain autonomous in fundamental rights and the rule of law, as long as it can 
be presumed that they safeguard the essence of these values. 
The Article strongly supports that the “inter alia clause” under the non-exhaustive 
list of Art. 20, para. 2, TFEU should be interpreted as including the Union’s foundational 
values, which also work as general legal standards of protection for EU citizens. In order 
for these to be used, they must be narrowed down to the essence of their content, 
which shares a similar rationale with the term “substance” in the doctrine. Although Art. 
2 TEU works as a legal standard of assessment, it cannot be interpreted as meaning 
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that the Member States are fully bound by the entire fundamental rights acquis, since 
this is expressly prevented by the Charter and the Treaty itself.101 On the contrary, it 
aims at safeguarding the essentials which are “common to the Member States”,102 cov-
ering long-standing national traditions103 used by several constitutional courts and in-
fringements of certain rights which cannot be justified in accordance with the CJEU’s 
case law.104 In Tele2 Sverige,105 the CJEU ruled that the right to freedom of expression 
(Art. 11, of the Charter), constitutes one of the EU’s foundational values under Art. 2 TEU 
and it is an essential foundation of a pluralist democratic society.106 
The right to effective judicial protection also falls under Art. 2 TEU, not only because 
it constitutes a component of the “rule of law”, but also because it is undoubtedly con-
nected to the “respect for human rights”. Relatively early in the case law, the Court in-
sisted that the Union is based on the rule of law and has built up in its case law a cata-
logue of elements inherent to the rule of law within the meaning of Art. 2 TEU,107 includ-
ing the principle of separation of powers,108 the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion109 and effective application of EU law.110 Consequently, a violation of the rule of law 
principle under Art. 2 TEU would likely aggravate a fundamental rights infringement, 
undermine the basic foundations of the EU legal order and the substantive meaning of 
Union citizenship.111 Infringements of this right, amounting in their extent and serious-
ness to the total inexistence of the fundamental right’s essence, cannot be adequately 
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remedied within a Member State but rather at the Union level.112 However, the use of 
Art. 2 TEU in the proposal, does not aim to establish its infringement but is rather used 
as a safety valve towards including only the “essentials” within Art. 20, para. 2. 
v.2. Another use of rights 
After defining the essence of Art. 2 TEU – delimiting the content eligible to be judicially 
incorporated into the “inter alia list” – the next step is to assess the scope of application 
of the respective Charter right or general principle, to determine its compatibility with 
the doctrine. The infringement under dispute must finally constitute a deprivation in 
accordance with the Zambrano doctrine, and not a mere inconvenience or impediment, 
so as to satisfy the proposed test and challenge rights-violating measures outside a 
strict interpretation of the scope of EU law. 
As a result of this divergence in interpretations of Art. 51, para. 1, the test’s wording 
is not entirely unambiguous.113 The question is thus to what extent the Court of Justice 
could interpret the scope of the Charter so as to fall within the “substance of the rights” 
doctrine. On the one hand, if the “implementation” concept is adopted according to 
Åkerberg Fransson,114 the Charter can be considered applicable in situations “falling 
within the scope of EU law” and be invoked in relation to the “substance of the rights” 
doctrine.115 On the contrary, if the Court cleaves to its narrow interpretation, this does 
not necessarily prevent the application of EU fundamental rights in purely internal situ-
ations,116 depending on the extent to which the narrow scope of the Charter can re-
strain the scope of those general principles as well.117 The prevailing view in this Article 
is that the scope of application of the Charter is narrower than that of general principles 
of EU law and the narrow scope of the former cannot affect that of the latter. 
After the pragmatic Opinion of AG Bot in Scattolon,118 the Court in Associação Sin-
dical dos Juízes Portugueses clarified that Art. 19, para. 1, TEU can be applied in full, 
even if the Charter does not apply, in a far-reaching demonstration of the Court’s judi-
cial activism in favour of European integration.119 It is therefore safe to say that at least 
in the case of effective judicial protection, general principles of EU law have a broader 
scope of application than the Charter rights, with the latter not affecting the former’s 
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application. Accordingly, the argument put forward by AG Mengozzi that the Charter 
prevents the inclusion of EU fundamental rights in the “substance of the rights” doctrine 
is not entirely correct120 or at least is not the only possible explanation. That being the 
case, and due to the complexity of the Charter’s scope, fundamental rights as general 
principles are more likely to be found eligible to be included in the “substance of the 
rights” doctrine as part of the new jurisdictional test. 
v.3. The paradigm of effective judicial protection 
A link between fundamental rights as general principles of EU law and the “substance of 
the rights” doctrine is accordingly attainable, provided that the relevant principle of EU 
law is “essential” under Art. 2 TEU and its scope of application is broader than that of 
Art. 20 TFEU. Although this possibility is arguably achievable for several principles, that 
of effective judicial protection is the most suitable for examination, since it has been a 
vulnerable and constantly violated right during the recent financial crisis, and recent ju-
dicial developments have substantially added to its significance.121 
The concept of “effective judicial protection” is dual-faced, occasionally referred to 
by the Courts as a self-standing “principle”122 of EU law or as a “fundamental right” un-
der the Charter.123 It inter alia entrusts the responsibility to ensure judicial review in the 
EU legal order both to the Court of Justice and to the national courts and tribunals.124 As 
discussed above, the Court made clear in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses 
that the scope of application of Art. 19 TEU is broader than that of Art. 47 of the Char-
ter.125 Through a particularly interesting legal reasoning, the Court built on “operational-
ising” Art. 2 TEU, by stating that Art. 19 TEU, “gives concrete expression to the value of 
the rule of law”.126 Without offering any explanation on the applicability of the Charter, 
the Court overcame the barrier in Art. 51, para. 1, and exclusively relied on Art. 19, para. 
1, TEU, merely by requiring the existence of a virtual link between the relevant national 
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measures and EU law and thus enabled natural and legal persons to challenge a broad-
er set of national measures using this route.127 This ruling has created a national legal 
obligation to safeguard judicial independence based on a combined reading of Arts 2, 4, 
para. 3, and Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, regardless of whether the situation falls within the 
scope of EU law. The judgment has far-reaching consequences for effective judicial pro-
tection since the Court went beyond the minimum effective necessity of the national 
remedies needed to ensure the application of EU law and gave the green light to pro-
ceed with the proposed jurisdictional test.128 
The new approach towards Art. 19 TEU is believed to have a great resemblance with 
the “substance of the rights” doctrine, since both were developed by the Court of Justice 
as the main actor, through the exercise of judicial activism. Moreover, they aimed to 
overcome the barrier created by the restricting provision of the Charter’s scope, while 
at the same time, both resulted in the enhancement of citizens’ rights protection. There 
are however significant dissimilarities between them, namely that the “substance of the 
rights” doctrine constitutes a tool for claiming EU legal jurisdiction, which is only trig-
gered when a deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights un-
der Art. 20 TFEU occurs.129 It can thus be characterised as a moderately invasive ap-
proach, which must be used as a last resort to preserve the effectiveness of EU law. In 
contrast, the development of Art. 19, para. 1, TEU130 constitutes a new general obliga-
tion, regardless of whether the matter falls within the scope of EU law. It is, therefore, 
more invasive, since it essentially created a federal standard of review for the principle 
of judicial independence that can now be directly invoked before national courts, 
demonstrating that the Court of Justice does not hesitate to issue courageous decisions 
to secure EU law.131 
This article proposes a practical tool for claiming jurisdiction under EU law, rather 
than a general obligation, to enable the review of national breaches of the rule of law 
occurring outside the areas covered by the EU’s acquis. Beyond the scope of the Char-
ter, applicants challenging austerity measures have not been able to successfully invoke 
EU fundamental rights, although numerous assistance packages were clearly granted 
through EU-established mechanisms, unless the “substance of the rights” doctrine was 
triggered and the matter was brought within the scope of EU law. According to the cur-
rent proposal, if an infringed right whose substance had been deprived by a national 
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measure was not expressed within the list of Art. 20, para. 2, the inter alia clause ap-
plies, suggesting that citizens can also enjoy the protection of other rights.132 The delim-
itation of the “eligible” rights is best achieved using Art. 2 TEU, without aiming to estab-
lish its infringement, but it is rather used as a boundaries-indicator. Subsequently, the 
scope of application of the respective Charter right or general principle is assessed to 
determine its compatibility with the doctrine. 
VI. Concluding remarks 
Recent judicial developments, including the “substance of the rights” doctrine, have built 
on the constitutional perspective of EU citizenship,133 by inter alia proving that the list of 
rights the Treaties express is not exhaustive, but can rather incorporate “unwritten” 
rights.134 More importantly, they have granted further opportunities for reinforcing EU 
fundamental rights protection, such as the proposed expansion of the “substance of the 
rights” doctrine towards including the principle of effective judicial protection, when a 
deprivation of the “substance of the rights” under the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion occurs. Nevertheless, strong objections against such a proposal can be raised. The 
proposed expansion of the doctrine can easily be perceived as a threat to the system of 
allocation of competences. However, no such contradiction occurs, because Art. 2 TEU is 
employed as a safety valve, confining the expansion of the proposal with the requirement 
for a deprivation of the substance of the rights, which safeguards national identities, pro-
vided that the foundations and the effectiveness of EU law are not eroded. 
Moreover, conflicts with other Treaty provisions can emerge, including with Art. 25, 
para. 2, TFEU which allegedly prevents the desired judicial incorporation of fundamental 
rights into citizenship status. However, this does not constitute an absolute obstacle to 
judicial incorporation, since the procedural limitations are read as applying to the legis-
lature only,135 thus ensuring the constitutional legitimacy of a judicial incorporation. The 
use of Art. 2 TEU could also raise arguments that the “values on which the Union is 
built” are illusory in a number of respects.136 Although an acquis on values would give it 
more weight, the increasing use of the provision in the Court’s case law proves the op-
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posite.137 Moreover, no conflict with Art. 7 TEU can arise since the proposal is not in-
tending to turn Art. 2 TEU into black-letter law or establish its violation, but rather to 
“operationalise” it, by shaping the essence of the values expressed therein, which also 
constitute basic rights to be enjoyed by EU citizens.138 
All in all, the proposal is fully in line with the doctrinal and jurisprudential ap-
proaches towards Union citizenship and will arguably allow citizens facing effective judi-
cial protection violations, including those faced during the financial crisis, to bring their 
cases within the scope of EU law, provided that the requirements described above are 
satisfied. Further rights can also be protected through this proposal if the test is satis-
fied, with equality and non-discrimination rights constituting the most likely candidates, 
considering that during the crisis, the disputed measures were commonly challenged 
before the Court as being discriminatory and that the general principle of non-
discrimination has long been established within the EU legal order. Although the pro-
posal’s reach is limited, it would definitely overcome the barrier imposed by Art. 51, pa-
ra. 1, of the Charter and safeguard the “substance” of the “essential” rights which must 
be included in the list of EU citizenship rights. It is also believed that such an incorpora-
tion in practice would prompt the Court to be more willing to claim jurisdiction, while 
the current imbalance between the EU’s purposes would be largely restored, by ac-
knowledging that the enjoyment of rights continued to lie at the heart of the EU, even 
during the financial crisis. 
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